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Security Analysis on a Conference Scheme for
Mobile Communications
Zhiguo Wan, Feng Bao, Robert H. Deng, and Akkihebbal L. Ananda
Abstract— The conference key distribution scheme (CKDS)
enables three or more parties to derive a common conference key
to protect the conversation content in their conference. Designing
a conference key distribution scheme for mobile communications
is a difficult task because wireless networks are more susceptible
to attacks and mobile devices usually obtain low power and
limited computing capability. In this paper we study a conference
scheme for mobile communications and find that the scheme
is insecure against the replay attack. With our replay attack,
an attacker with a compromised conference key can cause the
conferees to reuse the compromised conference key, which in
turn completely reveals subsequent conversation content.
Index Terms— Mobile communications, conference scheme,
security, privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
A CONFERENCE key distribution scheme (CKDS) en-ables three or more parties, which want to hold a
conference, to derive a common communication key for each
link in the communication network. There has been a lot of
research focusing on the conference key distribution scheme,
but not every proposal is suitable for wireless communications
because wireless devices usually have low power and limited
computing capability. Moreover, it is even more difficult
for CKDS to provide security in wireless networks because
wireless communications occur in the open air.
Many conference distribution schemes designed for wireless
communication systems have been shown to be insecure. The
key distribution scheme proposed by Tatebayashi et al. [16]
is attacked in [13] because the scheme uses a low exponent
RSA. Based on the conference key distribution protocol [5] for
the wireless environment, a conference scheme with dynamic
participation was proposed in [6], and another one employing
self encryption was proposed in [7]. But the former [6] has
been shown to be insecure in [12], and even worse, Bao
showed both [6] and [7] are vulnerable to a colluding attack
and the passive attack in [2].
Recently, a new conference key distribution scheme for
wireless environment was proposed by Yi el al. [17], [18].
This scheme extends the Beller-Chang-Yacobi schemes [3] to
establish a secret key in a group of conferees. Based on the
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modular square root (MSR) technique, the scheme reduces
the computational complexity substantially. This conference
scheme aims to provide conversation content privacy, con-
ferees’ location privacy, mutual authentication between the
conference bridge (the key distribution center) and conferees,
and security against replaying attacks.
In this paper, we show that their scheme does not fulfill the
design goals, and it is insecure against our replay attack. By
replaying previous information, an adversary with a compro-
mised conference key can successfully cause the conferees to
reuse the compromised conference key of the adversary, and
hence subsequent conversation content is completely exposed
to the adversary.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
discuss the related work in the next section. Then the Yi
et al.’s conference scheme is described in Section III. Then
we analyze the security of their scheme and show that their
scheme is insecure against our attack in Section IV. Finally,
we conclude the paper with our remarks in the last section.
II. RELATED WORK
Replay attacks pose a serious threat to security protocols,
and many security protocols have been shown to be vulnerable
to this kind of attack. Syverson presented an exhaustive taxon-
omy of replay attacks [15]. Syverson classifies replay attacks
into run external attacks and run internal attacks. In the
former case, an attacker replays messages from one protocol
in another protocol. While in the latter case, the replayed
messages come from the current protocol run. Run external
attacks can be further divided into interleaving replays and
classic replays. Interleaving replays require contemporaneous
protocols runs, but classic replays do not need.
The replay attack against the Needham-Schroeder key dis-
tribution protocol by Denning and Sacco [4], and the replay
attack presented in [8] are run external attacks. Moreover,
both attacks are classic replays. While in [14], the replay
attack against the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol presented by
Syverson belongs to the run internal attack. In this attack,
the attacker constructs the fourth message using the second
message he obtains in the same protocol run.
Many techniques have been suggested for security protocols
to counter replay attacks. Including nonces in messages is a
simple way to thwart replay attacks, and using time-stamps
in messages can also prevent replay attacks for synchronized
systems [4]. Other methods like using tagged bundle and
unique session-id, including sender’s and recipient’s identities
in messages, are also practical and efficient to improve security
against replay attacks [1], [9].
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III. THE CONFERENCE SCHEME
In Yi et al.’s scheme, the conference bridge is a conference
key distribution center in charge of distributing initial and
updated conference keys to conferees, while the conferees are
mobile users who take part in a conference. One participant
is chairperson who initiates the conference. Except the chair-
person, other conferees may join later and quit the conference
before it ends.
The conference scheme runs as follows. At first, a trusted
certificate authority needs to issue a secret certificate to each
conferee beforehand. Then the conference chairperson initiates
the conference with the conference bridge, and every conferee
establishes a secret key with the conference bridge using
the secret key establishing scheme. After that, a group of
conferees can use the conference key distributing scheme
to establish the conference key. If any conferee quits the
conference or a new person wants to join the conference,
the conference key updating scheme is used to update the
conference key to ensure privacy of following conversation
content.
Since the conference key updating scheme and the con-
ference key distributing scheme use the same technique for
distributing conference keys, we only describe the conference
key distributing scheme. Following the issuance of certificates
and the establishment of a secret key, each conferee Ci
establishes a secret key ki with the conference bridge. Then
the conference key distributing scheme runs as follows.
• The conference bridge B chooses a random number as a
conference key k and computes the following items.
I1 = Ek(IDB)
I2 = Ek(t||L)
I3 = [(A1, Ek1(k))|| · · · ||(Am, Ekm(k))]
Here IDB is the identity of the bridge, t is the time
stamp, L is the lifetime of the conference key k, Ai(i =
1, 2, . . . ,m) is the alias of conferee Ci, and Ex is the
encryption of a secret key cryptosystem with the secret
key x.
Then B broadcasts (I1, I2, I3) to all conferees.
• Upon receiving (I1, I2, I3), conferee Ci(i = 1, 2, . . . ,m)
looks up his alias Ai in I3 and extracts Eki(k) from I3.
Then he decrypts Eki(k) with ki to obtain k, decrypts I2
with k to obtain t, checks the validity of the time stamp
t, and verifies whether Dk(I1) = IDB . If so, k is an
authentic conference key, and a common conference key
k is established among all conferees.
The distribution of the conference key k to a new attendee
of the conference is omitted for brevity. But one should note
here that distributing the current conference key k to the new
attendee violates the forward secrecy, which means that that
new attendee would know previous communication content
with k if he saved previous traffics.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our security analysis focuses on the conference key distrib-
uting scheme and the conference key updating scheme. These
two subschemes employ the same technique to distribute the
conference key to all conferees. However, the bridge is not
authenticated in both subschemes and this in turn results in
easy impersonation attacks against these subschemes. In the
wireless environment, an attacker can impersonate a mobile
station or a centralized server like the access point [11]. In our
attack, the adversary mounts a replay attack by impersonating
the conference bridge. Specifically, the adversary with an old
conference key, which can be a conferee who has quit the
conference, masquerades as the bridge to communicate with
other conference and cause them to reuse the old conference
key of the adversary as the new conference key. As a result,
subsequent conversation content will be completely exposed
to the adversary.
In the following part, our attack against the conference key
distributing scheme is described in detail. In our attack, the
attacker holds a valid used conference key k′ for previous
conversation. This attacker can be a conferee who quit the
conference earlier or may obtain a compromised conference
key.
• Before the attack, the attacker stores corresponding I ′3
with respect to the known conference key k′:
I ′3 = [(A1, Ek1(k
′))|| · · · ||(Am, Ekm(k′))].
• With the conference key k′, the attacker constructs the
triplet (I ′′1 , I ′′2 , I ′′3 ) as follows. I ′′1 is created as I ′′1 =
Ek′ (IDB) while I ′′2 = Ek′ (t′||L′), where t′ is the current
time stamp and L′ is the life time chosen by the attacker.
Also the attacker constructs I ′′3 as I ′3 or part of I ′3, i.e.
I ′′3 = [(A1, Ek1(k
′))|| · · · ||(Am, Ekm(k′))],
or
I ′′3 = [(Ai1 , Eki1 (k
′))|| · · · ||(Ail , Ekil (k′))],
where i1, i2, . . . , il ∈ [1,m].
• The attacker impersonates the bridge and broadcasts
(I ′′1 , I ′′2 , I ′′3 ) to all the conferees. Upon receiving this
message, the conferee Ci looks up his alias Ai in I ′′3 and
extracts Eki(k′) to obtain k′. Then he decrypts I ′′2 , I ′′1
with k′ and find that the time stamp t′ is valid and
Dk′(I ′′1 ) = IDB , so he believes that k′ is an authentic
conference key and use it in subsequent conversation.
As a result, the subsequent conference conversation is com-
pletely exposed to the adversary since all the conferees will
use k′ which is known to the adversary as the new conference
key.
The same attack can be successfully applied on the con-
ference updating scheme since this subscheme employs the
same technique as the conference distributing scheme. Also,
it is obvious that our attack can exclude any valid conferee
from the conference by changing the conference key.
The insecurity of the scheme results from two design flaws
in the scheme. First of all, no authentication of the bridge is
guaranteed in the scheme. In the two subschemes we have
analyzed, the authentication technique for the bridge is highly
insecure and susceptible to replay attacks. Specifically, any
adversary with an valid old conference key can impersonate
the bridge. The second design flaw of the scheme is that no
key freshness of the conference key is provided in the scheme.
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Since the conference key is selected by the bridge only and the
conferees do not check it for freshness, a new conference key
can always be an used conference key. To prevent the replay
attack as mentioned, a simple countermeasure can be em-
ployed to avoid such design flaws. The conference bridge sim-
ply includes the time stamp in I1 and I3, i.e. I1 = Ek(t||IDB)
and I3 = [(A1, Ek1(t||k))|| · · · ||(Am, Ekm(t||k))]. In this
case, not only can the scheme effectively counter the replay
attack, but the freshness of the conference key is provided by
the time stamp.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyzed the security of the conference
scheme proposed by Yi et al. and found that two of the four
subschemes are vulnerable to replay attacks. We showed that
our attack can cause the conferees to reuse a previously used
conference key and hence disclose the conversation content.
Two design flaws lead to the insecurity of the conference
scheme. The first one is that the bridge is not authenticated
in the scheme, and the second is that key freshness is not
guaranteed with respect to the conference key.
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